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Tirreverently known by many Zimbabweans, was always likely to be something of an 
event. Having ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years, and 
as nearly the last of a whole generation of African 
liberation leaders in the region, Bob was in equal 
measures revered, feared, respected and despised 
across his country and beyond. For many across 
the wider region, he remained a respected 
as a welcome thorn in the side of ‘Western’ and 
global interests, and an icon of widely-resonating 
struggles for land and economic re-distribution. 
On the other hand, many ordinary Zimbabweans 
(those living in Zimbabwe and the millions etching 
out precarious lives in its diaspora) held a different 
opinion. After two decades of relentless economic 
crisis, political polarisation and numerous failed 
attempts to replace him electorally – often at 
enormous cost in terms of the violence unleashed 
against any perceived political opposition – Bob’s 
only way that things were ever going to change, 
the only way that Zimbabwe’s social, political and 
economic problems could ever be resolved. 
Meanwhile, for a hard core of ZANU PF loyalists, 
internal factionalism, Bob remained very much the 
‘hallowed’ father of Zimbabwean independence, 
Legacy’ – the ‘soft’ coup that unexpectedly pushed 
him out in November 2017 – have been at pains 
to maintain since taking over the presidency. 
For all these reasons, his death was always going 
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ɎȒ ƫƺ ɀǣǕȇǣˡƬƏȇɎً ƏǼƫƺǣɎ ǣȇ ƳǣǔǔƺȸƺȇɎ ɯƏɵɀ ǔȒȸ
different people. It was also long-anticipated: he 
was 95 and, until 2017, one of the world’s oldest 
serving presidents. Since the early 2000s, when I 
ƫƺǕƏȇ ˡƺǼƳɯȒȸǸ ǣȇ ñǣȅƫƏƫɯƺً ȵƺȒȵǼƺ ǝƏƳ ƫƺƺȇ
expecting, and maybe hoping, that he would kick 
the bucket soon. There were endless recurring 
rumours about his ill health, and his many 
expensive trips to see doctors in Singapore. Yet he 
ȒǔɎƺȇɀƺƺȅƺƳɎȒȸƺƫȒɖȇƳًˡɀɎɯƏɮǣȇǕƏȇƳɀɎȸȒȇǕً
still masterly manipulating ZANU PF’s rivalries and 
factions, so that Zimbabweans grimly joked that 
maybe he would never die. It only became harder 
to conceal his evident frailty in his latter years.
In many ways, Bob himself was responsible for 
ȅɖƬǝȒǔɎǝƺƏȇɎǣƬǣȵƏɎƺƳɀǣǕȇǣˡƬƏȇƬƺȒǔǝǣɀƳƺƏɎǝِ
Ever the ideologue, Bob had – since independence 
– constituted, politicised and instrumentalised
the national commemoration of Zimbabwe’s
liberation struggle through a system of district
and provincial ‘heroes’ acres’ across the country,
with its zenith at the National Heroes’ Acre in
Harare (Werbner, 1998). A deeply partisan and
much-contested process – long criticised for its
narrow version of liberation history and for its
marginalisation of so many other contributions to
Zimbabwean independence – the ‘national heroes’
system had become increasingly central to what
some called ‘Mugabeism’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015),
or ZANU PF’s ‘chimurenga politics’ (Chigumadzi,
א׎׏ז٣ِ Áǝƺ ǝǣɀɎȒȸǣƏȇ ÁƺȸƺȇƬƺ «ƏȇǕƺȸ ƬƏǼǼƺƳ Ɏǝƺ
system ‘patriotic history’, especially in the wake of
land reform and deepening political and economic 
crises in the 2000s. ZANU PF’s controversial
control of commemoration and the selection of its
‘national heroes’ is a key part of what I think of as
Zimbabwe’s ‘politics of the dead’ (Fontein, 2009).
Every year, Bob would lead annual ‘heroes’ day’
celebrations and an increasing number of state
funerals at Harare’s National Heroes’ Acre (as more
and more of the liberation generation passed
away). These were opportunities he apparently
relished a great deal, as he rambled and ranted at
tedious length, endlessly recanting his own revised 
versions of history, over the deceased bodies of
ZANU PF’s designated heroes, to bored bussed-in
audiences or on national television broadcasts.
Among the many hundreds of other graves,
some Great Zimbabwe-style walling, and some
fairly garish North Korean sculpted monuments,
Bob’s supposed burial spot had already long been 
marked out: on a top terrace next to Sally, his late 
ˡȸɀɎɯǣǔƺِ
Given all of this anticipation, and indeed 
ȵȸƺȵƏȸƏɎǣȒȇً ǣɎ ǣɀ ɎǝƺȸƺǔȒȸƺ ȇȒɎƏƫǼƺ ɎǝƏɎ Ɏǝƺ ˡȸɀɎ
announcements of his death in Singapore, on 
6th September 2019, were met with notable 
ambivalence among many Zimbabweans. Some 
of this ambivalence was predictable for a leader 
as controversial and polarising as Mugabe. 
A seemingly endless stream of obituaries, 
statements and commentaries by politicians, 
journalists, commentators and scholars quickly 
emerged. These could be categorised into three 
groups. Firstly, there were those who continued to 
valorise Bob’s liberation past, including respected 
ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ˡǕɖȸƺɀ ǼǣǸƺ JȸƏƬƏ xƏƬǝƺǼً ɀȵȒɖɀƺ
to Samora Machel and, later, to Nelson Mandela. 
Secondly, there were those who, for very good 
reasons, continued to vilify him, both for the 
economic mess Zimbabwe has endured for almost 
two decades, but even more so for the political 
violence of that period, including the atrocious, 
unresolved crimes of the gukurahundi massacres 
in the 1980s, when an estimated 20,000 civilians in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands were killed by the 
North Korean trained Fifth Brigade. Thirdly, there 
were those who sought to construct a middle 
path between Mugabe’s ‘heroic’ liberation past 
ˡǕǝɎǣȇǕ ƏǕƏǣȇɀɎ ƺɴɎȸƺȅƺ«ǝȒƳƺɀǣƏȇƫƺǼǼǣǕƺȸƺȇƬƺ
in the 1960s and 1970s, and his markedly mixed 
postcolonial record. Some of these accounts 
point to the positive, enduring legacies of Bob’s 
expansion of free education and health care in the 
1980s, whilst others frame his complex past in a 
familiar narrative of  ‘hero turned villain’ under the 
global pressures of neo-liberalism, or in the context 
of a wider disillusionment with the postcolonial 
dispensation across the region. Sometimes, 
In many ways, Bob himself was  
responsible for much of the anticipated 
Ü«¢Ã«ăÃÊ¡¨ «Üã¨ʈóØã¨«Ê¼Ê¢èʃ
Bob had – since independence – constituted, 
politicised and instrumentalised the  
national commemoration of Zimbabwe’s 
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such commentaries appealed to the necessity of 
‘not speaking ill of the dead’ to euphemise their 
biographies and obituaries. While the injunction 
to not speak ill of the dead has particular, and 
powerful, cultural connotations in a Zimbabwean 
context (which I return to below), others – such as 
«ɖɎǝxɖȸƏȅƫƏƳȒȸȒ٢א׎׏ח٣٫ƬȒɖȇɎƺȸƺƳɎǝƏɎɎǝƺȸƺ
is no such thing as an injunction against speaking 
of the dastardly deeds of someone like Bob. 
These ambivalences about Mugabe’s complex 
legacy were to be expected. What struck me, 
however, in speaking to Zimbabweans – and 
in reading the newspaper reports, blogs, 
commentaries, and twitter feeds that circulated 
immediately after his death – was a different kind of 
ambivalence, bordering on resigned indifference, 
or even disinterest. Quoted in The Guardian, for 
instance, was the following comment from a young 
woman – Esther Moyo – who attended Mugabe’s 
funeral primarily because it was an opportunity to 
sell more peanuts: ‘Mugabe is the reason we are 
in this mess…I just came here to sell my snacks 
to make a living...and to make sure the old man 
was really dead’ (Burke, 2019). For the many 
Zimbabweans scratching out a meagre living in its 
informal sector, or forced abroad to work low-level 
jobs in the face of xenophobic violence in South 
Africa, or increasingly vitriolic anti-immigration 
policies in the UK and elsewhere, Bob’s death was 
just too far away, too inconsequential to their daily 
lives, and maybe far too late to really matter. This 
kind of ambivalence and indifference seemed to 
suggest that Mugabe’s death was just a big anti-
climax.
Given how long Mugabe had been expected to 
ƳǣƺǣȇȒǔˡƬƺًƏɀǝƺ٢ƏȇƳɎǝȒɀƺƏȸȒɖȇƳǝǣȅ٣ǝƏƳȒǔɎƺȇ
implied, and for how long it had been assumed 
that this would be the moment of long-awaited 
political change, perhaps it was his unexpected 
ȸƺȅȒɮƏǼ ǔȸȒȅ ȒǔˡƬƺ ɎɯȒ ɵƺƏȸɀ ƺƏȸǼǣƺȸ ٫ ƏȇƳ ǝǣɀ
demise into political irrelevance soon afterwards 
– that led to his death not being as big a deal as
many had long expected. In a sense, he was already 
dead politically, regardless of the continuing
activities of the so-called G40 faction ousted with
him in November 2017, and the suggestions that
Bob had switched his support to the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) opposition in the 2018
elections. Moreover, as the new regime’s claims
to offer a more tolerant ‘open for business’ kind of
politics rapidly lost credibility with new outbreaks
of state-sponsored violence and killings in August
2018 and January 2019, amidst a new wave of
disappearances, and as the economy again
faltered, any promise that Mugabe’s demise would
offer meaningful change had already evaporated.
Conversely, for some, perhaps only a few, Bob’s
death could even be construed as meaningful
only in so much as his successor has been shown
to be even worse, with all of Bob’s violence and
intolerance, and none of his eloquence. If this kind
of ambivalence can be represented, then perhaps
it was best expressed in satirical memes that
circulated on social media in the weeks after Bob’s
ƳƺƏɎǝً ȸƺˢƺƬɎǣɮƺ Ȓǔ Ə ȵƏȸɎǣƬɖǼƏȸǼɵ ƬƏɖɀɎǣƬ ȵȒǼǣɎǣƬƏǼ
humour. My favourite is an image (entitled ‘Pastor
Lukau has done it again’) of Bob photo-shopped
onto a now famous photograph of a man sitting up 
ǣȇƏƬȒǔˡȇًɀɖȸȸȒɖȇƳƺƳƫɵƏƬǝɖȸƬǝƬȒȇǕȸƺǕƏɎǣȒȇً
having allegedly been brought back to life.
This kind of ambivalence, bordering on resigned 
ǣȇƳǣǔǔƺȸƺȇƬƺً ɀƺƺȅƺƳ ɎȒ ƫƺ ƬȒȇˡȸȅƺƳƫɵ ȸƺȵȒȸɎɀ
that suggested that Mugabe’s lying in state at two 
stadiums in the capital – and later at his rural home 
in Zvimba – were marked by poor attendance and 
Ə ǼƏƬǸ Ȓǔ ȵɖƫǼǣƬ ǣȇɎƺȸƺɀɎِ XɎ ǣɀ ɎǝƺȸƺǔȒȸƺژ ȇȒɎƏƫǼƺ
that other reports, particularly in the government 
press, were keen to emphasise the large numbers 
attendant at the airport to welcome his remains 
home and at various public vigils, as well as the 
ȇɖȅƫƺȸ Ȓǔ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ɮǣɀǣɎȒȸɀ ɯǝȒ ˢƺɯ ǣȇ ɎȒ
take part in the state funeral in September 2019. 
The actual numbers involved in these events were 
always likely to vary, and are hard to measure. There 
ǣɀƏǝǣɀɎȒȸɵȒǔǣȇˢƏɎƺƳˡǕɖȸƺɀǔȒȸɀɖƬǝƺɮƺȇɎɀًƏȇƳ
of people being bussed in by the ruling party, as 
well as of people gate-crashing funerals simply for 
the promise of food or drink. More intriguing is the 
possibility that Mugabe’s death being a non-event 
for a disinterested Zimbabwean public might not 
a¨ÜÂ«ó¼ÃÜÊèãAè¢ʰÜÊÂÕ¼ù
¼¢úôØãÊùÕãʈr¨ãÜãØè¹Âʃ
¨ÊôóØʃ«ÃÜÕ¹«Ã¢ãÊ}«ÂôÃÜʡÃ
in reading the newspaper reports, blogs, 
commentaries, and twitter feeds that circulated 
«ÂÂ«ã¼ú¡ãØ¨«Üã¨ʡôÜ«ėØÃã
¹«ÃÊ¡Â«ó¼ÃʃÊØØ«Ã¢ÊÃØÜ«¢Ã
«Ã«ėØÃʃÊØóÃ«Ü«ÃãØÜãʈ
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have passed muster for those for whom his death 
presented political opportunities too good or too 
ȵȸȒƫǼƺȅƏɎǣƬɎȒǣǕȇȒȸƺِژ
But if that was the case, there was no need for 
concern. The shenanigans that quickly emerged 
after Mugabe’s state funeral, about where and 
how to bury him, ensured that his death would, 
after all, become a memorable and controversial 
ƺɮƺȇɎًˡɎɎǣȇǕȒǔɎǝƺٻȵȒǼǣɎǣƬɀȒǔɎǝƺƳƺƏƳټژɎǝƏɎ Ȓƫ
ǝǣȅɀƺǼǔǝƏƳƳȒȇƺɀȒȅɖƬǝɎȒ ǔȒɀɎƺȸِژÁǝƺɀƺƫɖȸǣƏǼ
ƬȒȇɎȸȒɮƺȸɀǣƺɀ ȸƺˢƺƬɎƺƳ ɯǝƏɎ ɀƬǝȒǼƏȸɀ ɯȒȸǸǣȇǕ
elsewhere have written about in terms of the 
‘political lives of dead bodies’ (Verdery, 1999) 
or a reinvigorated ‘carnal fetishism’ across the 
region (Bernault, 2006; Cohen and Odhiambo, 
1992). Mugabe’s burial turned out to be far more 
intriguing and revealing than the initial sense of 
general ambivalence and disinterest had promised, 
suggesting indeed, as my favourite meme also 
implied, that it was Bob himself who had ‘done it 
again’ – ensuring that, in death as much as in life, 
Zimbabwean politics would continue to circulate 
around him. 
It was always likely that the new political regime 
of Emmerson Mnangagwa – also known as ED 
or the ‘ngwena’ (‘crocodile’) – would be keen to 
ensure that Mugabe was interred at the National 
Heroes’ Acre, and appropriately enshrined as one 
of independent Zimbabwe’s foundational heroes. 
Although Mnangagwa has been at pains to be 
seen to be creating distance from the previous 
regime (by seeking to re-engage the international 
ƬȒȅȅɖȇǣɎɵً ƫɵ ƬǼƏǣȅǣȇǕ ɎȒ ȵȸȒȅȒɎǣȇǕ ˡɀƬƏǼ
discipline and political tolerance, and even by 
promising to deal with the unresolved legacies 
of the gukurahundi), the truth is that his  politics 
do not radically rupture from Mugabeism. Even 
the ‘soft coup’ itself was carefully presented as an 
effort to preserve Bob’s and ZANU PF’s liberation 
legacy from the young miscreants gathered 
around him, including his deeply-disliked and 
vitriolic second wife, Grace. This was not just about 
needing regional legitimacy from the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the 
African Union (AU), although that did matter. It 
was more because – as key lieutenants in forging 
the ideology and political stylistics of ‘Mugabeism’ 
– the new leadership has always been invested
in ZANU PF’s ‘chimurenga politics’: a politics that
can be markedly gerontocratic and misogynistic,
Əɀ ƬǼƺƏȸǼɵ ƳƺȅȒȇɀɎȸƏɎƺƳ ǣȇ Ɏǝƺ ɮǣǼǣˡƬƏɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ
former vice-president Joice Mujuru by Grace
xɖǕƏƫƺ ٢ǼƺƏƳǣȇǕ ɎȒ hȒǣƬƺټɀ ȸƺȅȒɮƏǼ ǔȸȒȅ ȒǔˡƬƺ
in 2014), and later of Grace Mugabe herself by
the regime that ousted her husband. The new
regime’s determination to preserve its claim on
the legacies of Mugabeism explains the great care
that was taken to ensure that Mugabe, his wife
and his family were well-cared-for and given a very
generous ‘retirement’ package after his removal
in November 2017. This is also why efforts were
constantly made to publicly reconcile with Bob
and Grace following his ouster, even if Bob himself
was not so keen to play ball. In short, Mnangagwa’s
government were deeply invested in ensuring that
Mugabe took his place at the National Heroes’ Acre, 
in order to bestow his liberation legacy, ideology
and legitimacy onto the new regime. Even as
arrangements for Bob’s funeral and burial were
being discussed, Mnangagwa presided over the
burial at the National Heroes’ Acre of another senior 
ZANU PF and military commander – Major General
Trust Mugoba, who had coincidently died on the
same day as Mugabe – illustrating Mnangagwa’s
commitment to continuing the narrow politics
of ZANU PF-controlled commemoration that his
predecessor had forged.
But it seems Bob had anticipated that his former 
ZANU PF underlings would try to make use of his 
death in this way. Bitter and resolute, Mugabe 
apparently indicated before his death that he 
did not want to be buried at the National Heroes’ 
Acre, preferring instead to be buried at his rural 
home in Zvimba, as indeed is common among 
many who have rejected burial at the National 
Heroes’ Acre. The ironies reverberate here. Mugabe 
himself had presided over the burials of many 
former ZANU PF stalwarts who, having fallen out 
with him in life, had publicly refused to be buried 
The shenanigans that quickly emerged after 
Aè¢ʰÜÜãã¡èÃØ¼ʃÊèãô¨ØÃ¨Êô
to bury him, ensured that his death would, after 
¼¼ʃÊÂÂÂÊØ¼ÃÊÃãØÊóØÜ«¼
óÃãʃăãã«Ã¢Ê¡ã¨ʯÕÊ¼«ã«ÜÊ¡ã¨ʰ˅ã¨ã
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at the National Heroes’ Acre before their deaths, 
but were subsequently interred there anyway. This 
ȸƺˢƺƬɎɀًƏɀXǝƏɮƺƳǣɀƬɖɀɀƺƳƺǼɀƺɯǝƺȸƺًñzÈ¨Iټɀ
tendency to instrumentalise and contain in death 
ɎǝȒɀƺɯǝȒǝƏƳƳƺˡƺƳɎǝƺȅǣȇǼǣǔƺ٢IȒȇɎƺǣȇًא׎׏ז٣ِ
Through his will, and what he allegedly told his 
relatives in August before he died, Mugabe was 
doing the same. Understanding well how these 
politics worked, he was not prepared to allow his 
former comrades – who had so unceremoniously 
ȸƺȅȒɮƺƳǝǣȅǔȸȒȅȒǔˡƬƺǼƺɀɀɎǝƏȇɎɯȒɵƺƏȸɀƫƺǔȒȸƺ
– to use his body to prop up their ideological cause,
however much he himself had been an author of
ɎǝǣɀɀɎɵǼƺȒǔȵȒǼǣɎǣƬɀǣȇɎǝƺˡȸɀɎȵǼƏƬƺِ
Almost as soon as Mugabe’s body touched 
down at Harare airport, if not before, reports began 
emerging of a dispute between the government 
and Bob’s relatives, especially his wife Grace. The 
freneticism of the plans for the viewing of his 
body in two stadiums in Harare, and its journey to 
Zvimba for memorial services and body viewing 
Ɏǝƺȸƺً ɀƺƺȅƺƳ ɎȒ ȸƺˢƺƬɎ Ɏǝƺ ɖȇɀɖȸƺ ƳǣȸƺƬɎǣȒȇ ǣȇ
ɯǝǣƬǝǝǣɀƫɖȸǣƏǼɯȒɖǼƳȵȸȒƬƺƺƳِɎˡ ȸɀɎًɎǝƺɎƺȇɀǣȒȇ
about where he should be buried appeared to 
be, rather simply, between the government who 
wanted him interred at the National Heroes’ Acre, 
and the family – headed by Grace and supported 
by community and clan elders and chiefs in 
Zvimba – who wanted him buried according to 
his own wishes, and according to local traditions, 
amongst other ‘chiefs’ in a secret cave near his 
rural home. Many recognised Bob’s wishes as 
a deliberate last snub to those who had ousted 
ǝǣȅًƏɯƏȸƺɎǝƏɎñzÈ¨IɯȒɖǼƳˡȇƳǣɎƳǣǔˡƬɖǼɎɎȒ
impose its will, having already publicly committed 
itself to respecting Mugabe’s and his family’s 
wishes. Evocative statements from some relatives 
– especially from Leo Mugabe (his nephew) – that
Mugabe had been hounded to an early death
by the way ZANU PF had treated him after the
ƬȒɖȵ ٢ǼƏɎƺȸ ȸƺȵƺƏɎƺƳ ƫɵ ³ȒɖɎǝ ǔȸǣƬƏټɀ ˡȸƺٮƫȸƏȇƳ
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius
Malema, when he visited to pay his respects) clearly 
upped the pressure on the ruling party.
It was therefore with some surprise that 
news was received a few days after his funeral 
that the family had, reluctantly, agreed to allow 
Mugabe to be buried at the National Heroes’ 
Acre. The negotiations must have been tense and 
acrimonious, especially because the agreement 
arrived at was that Bob would not be interred in 
Ɏǝƺ ǼȒȇǕٮɮƏƬƏȇɎ ɀȵȒɎ ȇƺɴɎ ɎȒ ³ƏǼǼɵً ǝǣɀ ˡȸɀɎ ɯǣǔƺً
but rather in a new, still-to-be-built ‘mausoleum’ 
to be hastily constructed at a spot on the summit 
Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ɀȅƏǼǼ ǝǣǼǼ ƏɎ RƺȸȒƺɀټ Ƭȸƺً ǣƳƺȇɎǣˡƺƳ ƫɵ
some of his immediate relatives. This would take 
some weeks to build, and many began to wonder 
how long Bob’s body would be lying in state, or 
ferried between Zvimba and the enormous, garish 
ٻ Ǽɖƺ«ȒȒǔټȅƏȇɀǣȒȇǣȇRƏȸƏȸƺɯǝƺȸƺǝƺƏȇƳJȸƏƬƺ
had lived. 
According to common cultural beliefs and 
practices related to death in Zimbabwe, the period 
between someone’s death and their burial is 
often seen as a particularly anxious and unsettled 
period, because the spirit of the deceased is 
believed to hover around the body dangerously. 
Grace Mugabe spent much of this period under 
a heavy black veil, maintaining a vigil around her 
late husband’s corpse. Many mused that Grace 
must have managed, in some way, to get her way 
by refusing to allow Bob to be buried next to his 
ɀɎǣǼǼٮȵȒȵɖǼƏȸ ˡȸɀɎ ɯǣǔƺِ Ɏǝƺȸɀ ƺǣɎǝƺȸ ƏȵȵǼƏɖƳƺƳ
or strongly critiqued the decision to build a new 
separate and elevated mausoleum for Mugabe, 
Əɀ ƺǣɎǝƺȸ ƫƺˡɎɎǣȇǕ Ȓǔ ǝǣɀ ɖȇǣȷɖƺ ǼƺǕƏƬɵً Ȓȸ Əɀ Əȇ
obvious extenuation of ZANU PF’s long-running 
politics of distorting Zimbabwe’s liberation past 
by privileging some legacies and contributions, 
and denigrating others. Indications of the pressure 
that Mnangagwa’s regime must have placed upon 
Grace and Bob’s relatives became clearer when it 
emerged a few days later that the title deeds on 
Ɏǝƺ Ǽɖƺ «ȒȒǔ ƏȇƳ ƏȇȒɎǝƺȸRƏȸƏȸƺ ǝȒɖɀƺ ȒɯȇƺƳ
by the family were listed in ZANU PF’s name, but 
ɯȒɖǼƳ ȇȒɯً ȒɖɎ Ȓǔ ƬȒȇƬƺȸȇ ǔȒȸ Ɏǝƺ ǔȒȸȅƺȸ ˡȸɀɎ
family’s wellbeing, be transferred into their name. 
Suggestions that the threat of withholding these 
title deeds had been waved over the family’s heads, 
in order to get their approval, revealed the extent 
Understanding well how these politics 
worked, he was not prepared to allow 
his former comrades – who had so 
èÃØÂÊÃ«ÊèÜ¼úØÂÊó¨«Â¡ØÊÂÊĜ
less than two years before – to use his body 
ãÊÕØÊÕèÕã¨«Ø«Ê¼Ê¢«¼èÜʃ¨ÊôóØ
much he himself had been an author of this 
Üãú¼Ê¡ÕÊ¼«ã«Ü«Ãã¨ăØÜãÕ¼ʈ
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to which ZANU PF were invested in ensuring that 
Bob would be interred at Heroes’ Acre. 
Soon, however, the politics surrounding Bob’s 
burial became even more complex, after it 
emerged that Grace had wanted Mugabe buried 
ƏɎ Ɏǝƺ Ǽɖƺ«ȒȒǔȅƏȇɀǣȒȇ ǣȇRƏȸƏȸƺً ƫɖɎ Ɏǝƺ ƬǣɎɵ
authorities had refused permission, citing city 
by-laws. Not only is it likely that the city authorities 
could have succumbed to ZANU PF pressure to 
refuse this request, but this detail also suggested 
that Grace, Bob’s children and the rest of Bob’s 
family, let alone the chiefs and community elders 
in Zvimba, were not necessarily speaking with the 
ɀƏȅƺɮȒǣƬƺƏɎƏǼǼِ ÁǝǣɀɯƏɀ ǼƏɎƺȸ ƬȒȇˡȸȅƺƳɯǝƺȇ
it emerged that several Zvimba chiefs had fallen 
out with Grace, and were forcibly ejected from her 
ongoing vigil around the corpse, because they had 
sided with ZANU PF, and argued that Bob should 
in fact be interred at Heroes’ Acre in Harare. 
The controversies deepened further soon after. 
With building work on the mausoleum already 
proceeding, it was suddenly announced – on 
September 27th 2019 – that plans had changed 
again, and that Bob would now be buried in 
ñɮǣȅƫƏƏǔɎƺȸƏǼǼِ«ȒƫƺȸɎxɖǕƏƫƺɯƏɀɎǝƺȇǝƏɀɎǣǼɵ
buried one day later in a specially-designed casket 
and a cement-lined grave at the centre of his 
family homestead. The event was a private, guest-
list-only affair, which Mnangagwa did not attend. 
The causes of the family’s change of mind remain 
open to speculation, although the role of Julius 
Malema, and his outspoken critique of ZANU PF’s 
pressure on Grace and her family, was quickly 
ǣƳƺȇɎǣˡƺƳƫɵ ɀȒȅƺ Əɀ Ə Ǹƺɵ ǔƏƬɎȒȸِ ÁǝƏɎxɖǕƏƫƺ
was buried in the centre of his homestead, and not 
in a special and secret burial location for Zvimba 
elders and chiefs, as had earlier been suggested, 
ƬȒȇˡȸȅƺƳ ɎǝƏɎJȸƏƬƺƏȇƳ Ɏǝƺ ǔƏȅǣǼɵǝƏƳ ǣȇƳƺƺƳ
likely fallen out with local community elders, as 
well as with the ruling party. It later emerged that 
ZIMBABWE
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Leo Mugabe – self-styled family spokesman – had 
also been excluded from the family burial, amid 
rumours that he and Grace had fallen out after 
Grace accused Leo of taking bribes from ZANU PF 
to ensure Bob’s burial in Harare. Whatever family 
intrigues were at play, however, the end result was 
a kind of double ‘fuck you’ to Mnangagwa and his 
new regime, with the half-built mausoleum at 
RƺȸȒƺɀټƬȸƺƏǔˡȸȅǣȇǕɎǝƏɎ ȒƫɯƏɀȇȒɎȒȇǼɵƫƺɎɎƺȸ
than any other ZANU PF hero, but that he had also 
managed to defy his ousters till the very end. It will 
be curious to see what the longer term fall-out will 
be, but it is likely that a furious Mnangagwa will 
ˡȇƳɀȒȅƺƏȵȵȸȒȵȸǣƏɎƺɯƏɵɎȒȸƺɀȵȒȇƳِ
As if all of this is not enough, there is yet another 
dimension to the controversies surrounding Bob’s 
burial that is worthy of comment. After the burial, 
reports and rumours soon began to emerge that 
throughout the troubled negotiations between 
Grace, the family and ZANU PF, great concern 
had been circulating about ensuring that Bob’s 
body was protected from any nefarious attempts 
to tamper with his corpse, or to remove his body 
parts. This, some suggested, was the reason for 
Grace’s apparent refusal to allow Bob’s body to be 
held at any city morgues or at One Commando 
barracks, where national heroes are usually kept 
preceding burial. And it was this concern which 
fuelled (rumours suggest) Grace’s exhausting (but 
well-performed) mourning vigil, and her insistence 
that Bob’s body could only be kept and displayed 
under careful guard at her home in Harare, and 
later in Zvimba. According to Leo Mugabe, Bob 
had himself been concerned that his enemies 
might want to steal and make use of his body 
parts for nefarious rituals to accrue ‘occult’ power. 
These suggestions fed rumours circulating in the 
press and on social media about the number of 
ƳǣǔǔƺȸƺȇɎƬȒǔˡȇɀɎǝƏɎ ȒƫƏȵȵƺƏȸƺƳɎȒǝƏɮƺƫƺƺȇ
displayed in during the weeks since his death, 
as well as reports that a special ‘tamper-proof’ 
ƬȒǔˡȇǝƏƳƫƺƺȇƬȒȇɀɎȸɖƬɎƺƳǔȒȸǝǣȅɎȒƫƺǣȇɎƺȸȸƺƳ
ǣȇِ «ƺˢƺƬɎǣȇǕ Ɏǝƺ ƳɖȵǼǣƬǣɎɵ ɎǝƏɎ ǣɀ ƬȒȅȅȒȇ ɎȒ
such rumours, Grace’s long and tortured vigil 
performance later sparked suggestions that it was 
she herself who had sought to make nefarious use 
of Bob’s potent corporeality.
There have long been whiffs of the ‘occult’ 
to ZANU PF’s style of politics, and to its internal 
factionalism. This dimension of Zimbabwean 
political life is as broad and diverse as religious 
and spiritual life in Zimbabwe in general. It ranges 
from the long-term association of some strands of 
African nationalism with spirit mediums, ancestral 
practices and so-called ‘traditional religion’ (which 
has been well-discussed in the literature), to 
increasingly spectacular overtures towards new 
charismatic Pentecostal movements in recent 
years. It extends to include both the ridiculous – such 
as the much-mocked involvement of Mugabe’s 
top ministers with the fraudulent ‘Diesel N’anga’, 
ɯǝȒƬǼƏǣȅƺƳɎȒȵȸȒƬɖȸƺȸƺˡȇƺƳƳǣƺɀƺǼǔȸȒȅȸȒƬǸɀ
in Chinoyi, in 2007 – to the downright malicious, 
such as the accusations of witchcraft that Grace 
Mugabe levied at two previous vice-presidents 
٢ˡȸɀɎ hȒǣƬƺ xɖǴɖȸɖً ƏȇƳ Ɏǝƺȇ xȇƏȇǕƏǕɯƏ ɯǝȒ
replaced her in 2014), as part of the intensifying 
ǔƏƬɎǣȒȇƏǼȵȒǼǣɎǣƬɀȒǔxɖǕƏƫƺټɀǼƏɎɎƺȸɵƺƏȸɀǣȇȒǔˡƬƺً
which led to both losing their positions. Conversely, 
the statements, rumours and claims associating 
Mugabe’s rule with some kind of divine, ancestral, 
or even occult providence have often contributed to 
the aura of totalising, all-encompassing power and 
supremacy that was weaved around him. Although 
sometimes the cause of ridicule, these dimensions 
of ZANU PF politics are extraordinarily effective 
and affective. This derives from their uncertain 
duplicity: both their ability to cast any perceived 
opposition into an over-determined position of 
absolute malevolence and, conversely, in making 
Mugabe appear transcendental, omnipotent, and 
untouchable. Seen in this light, there is nothing 
particularly unusual or ‘exotic’ about this stylistics 
of power. It is with this in mind that we should seek 
to understand the corporeal politics of the dead 
that circulated around Bob’s cadaver, which Grace 
ȵƺȸǔȒȸȅƺƳɀȒȅƏǕȇǣˡƬƺȇɎǼɵِ
There are deep cultural aspects of Zimbabwean 
beliefs and practices to do with bodies and the 
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dead, which cross over religious tensions and 
transformations between regional ancestral cults 
and different kinds of churches (older missionary 
and African Independent churches, and more 
recent Pentecostal movements). A central belief 
is that corpses are dangerous between death and 
burial, both for the often-unhappy spirits of the 
dead (who during this period are said to ‘hover’ 
around them), and for the troubling potential 
potencies of their corporeal substances. Indeed, a 
system of funerals, burials and memorial services, 
culminating in kugadzira (Shona) or umbuyiso 
(Ndebele) ceremonies a year or more after death 
(through which, in more ‘traditional settings’, 
it is understood that settled, benign sprits are 
‘returned’ to the homestead from a period of ‘exile’ 
in the bush) can be understood as processes of 
managing the transformation of life into death, 
of dealing with and containing the dangerous 
corporeal substances that death involves, and of 
making people safely and benevolently dead. This 
is why an injunction against speaking ‘ill of the 
dead’ has particular potency in a Zimbabwean 
context, as dead people are considered dangerous 
before burial, and before this process is complete. 
Indeed, there are many cases of relatives of 
murdered people deliberately not burying their 
dead in order to force compensation or some 
kind of response from those deemed culpable, 
who might become haunted by the dangerous 
unsettled spirits known as ngozi. The fact that 
Mugabe himself was often rumoured to have 
been haunted – by the unsettled spirits of people 
whose death he was said to have orchestrated – 
illustrates how such cultural beliefs around death 
can be politically salient. It is also in this context 
that the long delays around Bob’s burial were 
already politically affective and anxiety provoking. 
Similarly, it is also common in Zimbabwe for 
people to be anxious about protecting the graves 
of recently buried people, because witches and 
those who practice witchcraft are often believed 
(and certainly morally) as ‘anti-human’, witches are 
understood to demonstrate and substantiate this 
through consuming the dangerous substances of 
decaying corpses. It is therefore very common for 
people to check graves for any signs of disturbance 
during the days after a funeral. Likewise, grandiose 
and cemented grave mountings – as have 
become increasingly common throughout the 
region – serve to function not only as a way of 
monumentalising the continuing memory of the 
dead, but also to keep them contained and secure. 
Indeed, these two things reinforce each other: a 
highly monumentalised grave covered in concrete 
reinforces the power of a dead person as someone 
not only to be remembered, but whose corporeal 
substances are themselves potent and dangerous, 
and in need of being contained and protected. 
It is in this context that we can understand how 
the controversies surrounding where and how Bob 
was to be buried, which I have discussed above, 
were aligned with this other more corporeal kind 
of politics – that is, that the rumours that Grace’s 
the cement-lined grave, unusually placed in the 
middle of his rural homestead, were all a response 
to Bob’s own fears that his body parts would be 
the target of nefarious interference by malevolent 
interests aligned against him and his family. These 
rumours and performances all served to reinforce 
Bob’s (and perhaps Grace’s) omnipotent salience 
and corporeal presence in Zimbabwean politics, 
just as the refusal, then acceptance and then 
refusal again, to bury Bob at the National Heroes’ 
Acre had ensured that his death and burial would 
become as eventful and talked about as they were 
always supposed to be. Bob had indeed done it 
again.  
References
Journal 
of African History. 47 (2), pp. 207–39.
Burke, J. (2019). Pomp, thin crowds and mixed feelings as Robert Mugabe 
is buried. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/sep/15/pomp-thin-crowds-mixed-feelings-as-robert-mugabe-
laid-to-rest
Chigumadzi, P. (2018). These Bones Will Rise Again. Johannesburg: Jacana 
Media.
Cohen, D. and Odhiambo, E. (1992) Burying SM: The Politics of Knowledge 
and the Sociology of Power in Africa. London: James Currey.
Fontein, J. (2009). The Politics of the Dead: Living heritage, bones 
and commemoration in Zimbabwe. [online] Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK & Commonwealth. Available at: https://www.
theasa.org/publications/asaonline/articles/asaonline_0102.shtml
Fontein, J. (2018). Political Accidents in Zimbabwe. Kronos. 44 (1), pp. 33–58. 
Mugabe and the tradition to not speak ill of the 
dead. [online] Mail & Guardian. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2019-09-
23-mugabe-and-the-tradition-to-not-speak-ill-of-the-dead/
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (Ed). (2015). Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in 
Zimbabwe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
Verdery, K. (1999). The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and 
Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of 
Power. London: Zed Books.
ZIMBABWE
V o l u m e  8 4  /  2 0 2 0
  Joost Fontein joined the University of Johannes-
burg as Professor of Anthropology in September 
2018. This article is an abridged extract from his 
forthcoming monograph  The Politics of the Dead 
in Zimbabwe 2000 – 2015: Bones, Rumours & 
Spirits (James Currey 2021). Before joining UJ he 
was based in Nairobi as Director of the British Insti-
tute in Eastern African (2014-18), on secondment 
from the University of Edinburgh, where he taught 
social anthropology for seven years (2007-2014). 
His research explores the political and material 
imbrications of landscapes, things and human 
substances. He has done extended periods of 
ethnographic fieldwork in Zimbabwe since the 
late 1990s. His doctoral research (Edinburgh 2003), 
explored the politics of heritage and landscape 
around Great Zimbabwe National Monument in 
Southern Zimbabwe. It won the ASA UK Audrey 
Richards Prize in 2004, and was published as a 
monograph (UCL Press) in 2006. His second mono-
graph Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water and 
Belonging (James Currey, June 2015) was shortlist-
ed for the Melville Herskovitts prize by the ASA USA 
in 2016, and was reprinted a paperback in 2018. His 
more recent research has focused on emergence, 
materiality and becoming in urban contexts, as 
part of a large multi-authored, collaborative 
project between scholars and artists that he has 
co-initiated entitled Nairobi Becoming. For this 
project he has done ethnographic fieldwork across 
Nairobi looking at water supply and sanitation in 
Mathare, at the city's architectural salvage and the 
demolition industry, and at urban goat keeping 
and trading at Kiamiako, in Huruma. He is current-
ly involved in two multi-authored, interdisciplinary 
book projects, one looking at Nairobi, and the 
other at Temporal frontiers and the excessivity of 
Time. Since joining the BIEA in 2014 he has also 
created films and installations for, and co-curated, 
various exhibitions in Nairobi (at the BIEA and at 
the National Museum), including Remains, Waste 
& Metonymy I  (October 2015 & February 2016); 
Remains, Waste & Metonymy II: Sensing Nairobi 
(February 2017 & June 2017), and Remains, Waste & 
Metonymy III: Kikulacho Nairobi (February and 
September 2018). He is a founding member of the 
Bones Collective research group, a former editor of 
the Journal of Southern African Studies 
(2008-2014), and co-founder of Critical African 
Studies. 
ZIMBABWE
